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“DUTY-DEFINING POWER” AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT’S CIVIL DOMAIN
Timothy Zick∗
Response to: Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free
Speech and Civil Liability, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650 (2009).
In Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,1 Daniel Solove and Neil
Richards attempt something truly ambitious. The authors seek to map
coherent boundaries for the First Amendment’s vast civil domain. Their
project merits serious attention. Currently, different rules apply to civil
liability for speech depending on whether the liability arises in tort,
contract, or property. Solove and Richards claim that these boundaries
are unworkable, under-theorized, and in some cases destined to collide.
They develop a framework for mapping the First Amendment’s civil
domain that is based upon a distinction regarding the type of power the
state exercises in various civil liability contexts. This response critically
examines the choice and meaning of power, and the boundaries that a
power-defining approach would draw.
I. CURRENT BOUNDARIES AND APPROACHES
The boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain have not
been systematically drawn. The Court started mapping civil liability
boundaries in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 owing to the unique First
Amendment concerns raised by state libel laws. From that point
forward, there appears to have been no master plan. Indeed, the
present boundaries might well have been quite different. With respect
to access to certain private properties, for example, the Court was in
favor of First Amendment applicability just a few years before it ruled
against it.3
∗

Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
1. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability,
109 Colum. L. Rev. 1650 (2009).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Compare Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1968) (holding nonemployee union members had right to
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As Solove and Richards observe, the current boundaries have not
been adequately justified.4 Most tort claims seem to have been
reflexively brought within the First Amendment’s domain, while most
contract and property claims have remained beyond these borders. As
Solove and Richards note, however, civil liability boundaries often
overlap and intersect. For example, breach of confidentiality has both
tort and contract characteristics.5 Which rule ought to apply?
As the authors note, tort, contract, and property liability all may
substantially affect expressive interests. “Private” law, whatever its
specific form, might dictate or distort public discourse, suppress the free
flow of information, and limit opportunities for public exchange.
Moreover, all civil liability emanates from the state. By what logic or
principle, then, are only certain claims to be excluded from the First
Amendment’s civil domain?
Solove and Richards do superb work culling various proposed
answers to this question from existing shards of judicial reasoning and
academic commentary.6 They contend, however, that each of the
approaches is conceptually or theoretically flawed, and that none
coherently explains the existing boundaries of the First Amendment’s
civil domain. Solove and Richards attempt to synthesize the vast
landscape of civil liability under a single First Amendment framework.
They urge that power be the new principal boundary marker. The
authors claim that the First Amendment is substantively applicable
whenever “(1) the government defines the content of the civil duty; and
(2) the speaker cannot avoid accepting the duty, or the government
exercises undue power in procuring the speaker’s acceptance.”7 Claims
that satisfy both elements of this definition are examples of the exercise
of “duty-defining power,” which the authors contend merits serious First
Amendment scrutiny. All other civil claims arise from the exercise of
“non-duty-defining power,” which does not trigger any First Amendment
scrutiny.8
Solove and Richards note that under this framework, the general
boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain would be largely
unchanged. Thus, enforcement of most tort duties would continue to
receive serious First Amendment scrutiny, while enforcement of most
contractual duties would receive none.9 As explained below, the extent
to which the power-defining approach would redraw the boundaries of
peacefully picket on property owned by mall), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521
(1976) (holding speakers had no First Amendment rights at private shopping center).
4. See Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1652–54 (discussing cases of civil liability
and free speech that have different outcomes under First Amendment).
5. Id. at 1669–70.
6. Id. at 1673–85 (discussing various approaches).
7. Id. at 1692 (emphasis omitted).
8. See id. at 1687–90 (explaining distinction between duty-defining and non-dutydefining power).
9. As noted infra Part III.B, the landscape with respect to property claims would be
revised.
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the First Amendment’s civil domain is debatable. In any event, the
authors’ principal goal is to offer a more coherent justification for both
the boundaries that exist and for the treatment of claims located at the
borders, where civil forms of action sometimes overlap and intersect.
II. AUTONOMY, CONSENT, AND STATE POWER
Before turning to the power-defining framework, I want first to
consider one of the approaches the authors reject—the “consensual
waiver” approach. Where a speaker voluntarily agrees not to speak, as in
a confidentiality agreement, why should the First Amendment apply to
the enforcement of that promise? The speaker has a strong liberty
interest in making such decisions.10 This liberty interest plausibly
explains some portion of the First Amendment’s current civil landscape.
In particular, it seems to solve the vexing puzzle of confidentiality claims.
As Solove and Richards acknowledge, principles of consent and
autonomy play a significant role in their power-defining framework.
Indeed, the rather substantial influence of autonomy on the powerdefining framework (it affects both elements of the definition of “dutydefining”) is such that one might wonder why a new approach grounded
in “power” is necessary at all.
Solove and Richards claim that the consensual waiver approach fails
to take into account the rights of audiences to receive information. But
their approach might be subject to the same criticism. Under the powerdefining approach, so long as private parties voluntarily negotiate
expressive limits or enter relationships in which a duty of confidentiality
is implicit, putative audience members have no cognizable First
Amendment objection to the loss of what may in some cases be
information of vital public concern. As a theoretical matter, rejecting a
pure autonomy approach at least allows for some consideration of
audience interests. As a practical matter, however, the switch to power
would seem to benefit audiences only minimally, if at all.
Solove and Richards also claim that the consensual waiver approach
permits the state to effectively purchase silence from speakers. Their
example is a cash-for-silence contract, under which the government can
purchase the suppression of criticism of its own policies.11 But as Solove
and Richards note, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, such
an agreement would be unenforceable.12 The state may, of course,
attempt to purchase or coerce silence in more subtle ways. The First
Amendment is applicable, however, whenever the sovereign acts—
whether as regulator, subsidizer, purchaser, contractor, employer, or

10. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that First Amendment
protects “the right to refrain from speaking at all”). See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989) (offering theory of free speech grounded
in liberty and autonomy).
11. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1690.
12. Id. at 1690–91.
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property owner. Further, as the authors note, waivers of constitutional
rights are strictly construed by courts.13 In other words, concerns
regarding the exercise of “undue power” by the state are, to some
extent, built into existing First Amendment doctrine.
A pure autonomy approach helps to untangle the civil liability knot,
specifically as it relates to the problem of confidentiality. The principal
weakness of the autonomy approach is its lack of comprehensiveness. If
the goal is to explain the relationship between free speech and civil
liability in an expansive sense, principles of consent and autonomy only
advance the project so far. Autonomy principles shed important light on
one region of the civil liability landscape. They cannot justify or explain
the remaining boundaries. The question is whether a power-based
approach, modified by principles of speaker autonomy, has greater
explanatory power than an autonomy approach, modified by concerns
regarding state power.
III. DUTY-DEFINING POWER AND CIVIL DISCOURSE
As Solove and Richards observe, the object of line drawing in the
civil liability context is to identify instances in which state-sponsored civil
actions pose the greatest threat to free speech. Mechanically and
theoretically, “power” is better suited to this task than autonomy.
Speech regulations are ordinarily viewed, often quite skeptically,
through the prism of power. And some civil liability, as the authors
correctly note, is in essence a form of regulatory power.14 But it is not, as
the authors suggest, the mere imposition of any mandatory duty
regulating social conduct that seriously threatens the First Amendment.
Rather, as is true with regard to any speech regulation, it is the character
or substance of the duty that ought to determine the degree of the First
Amendment threat. This, ultimately, is what separates many tort and
statutory speech rules from contract rules; it is also, as I will suggest
below, one of the things that sets property-based liability apart from
other forms of civil liability.
A. Civil Liability as Regulatory Power
Solove and Richards note that civil liability is most troublesome
from a First Amendment perspective “when it inhibits or tries to direct
public discourse.”15 Accordingly, the authors are primarily concerned
with “[t]he government’s role in shaping the speaker’s expression,”16
specifically instances in which the state is “dictating, distorting, or

13. Id. at 1677 n.149.
14. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
782, 789 (1986) (“The Constitution speaks about freedom of speech, and liability rules
can tread upon that freedom as much as direct regulation can.”).
15. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1689.
16. Id.
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suppressing the terms or content of public discourse.”17 They seek to
identify forms of government power that are “particularly dangerous and
should be curtailed as abridgements of free expression.”18 This is the
appropriate benchmark. The question is whether the power-defining
framework draws boundaries that faithfully track it.
Solove and Richards convincingly establish that, as a function of
speaker autonomy and consensual waiver, contractual claims that do not
involve the exercise of undue state power or influence properly lie
outside the First Amendment’s domain. But that leaves a substantial
landscape of tort and statutory liability. Words are a potential basis for a
staggering amount of civil liability. The state imposes countless
mandatory duties that have some impact on the act of speaking. In
addition to libel and privacy, common law duties imposed under assault,
negligence, alienation of affections, interference with prospective
economic advantage, and even trespass to chattels torts, all may
incidentally impact speech.19 Under the power-defining framework, all
of these actions, and presumably any others not based upon consensual
waiver, are deemed “particularly dangerous” threats to public discourse
20
and public debate. As a result, in common law actions the rule must
either be altered, as in the case of libel, or courts must engage in ad hoc
balancing.21
This approach would formally constitutionalize substantial areas of
the common law. That would certainly be consistent with some recent
trends, as evident in areas from punitive damages to prison litigation.
But it bears emphasizing that Sullivan, from which this line-drawing
exercise emanates, was an anomaly. The presumption, as Richard
Epstein has noted, “should be in favor of the constitutional permissibility
of the common law rules.”22 On this view, the rules ought to be altered
or displaced by constitutional principles only where truly necessary to
preserve core First Amendment rights and values. We ought to be
looking, as the authors suggest, for the “cases where the government is
using the civil liability system in ways that are especially dangerous.”23
In drawing their boundaries, Solove and Richards have plainly
opted for certainty over flexibility. The authors are extremely skeptical
of state power, so much so that irrespective of the particular content of
the duty being imposed, they perceive a serious threat to public
discourse.
Anyone who has struggled with the definitional and
theoretical difficulties inherent in this area can appreciate their choice.
Moreover, persuasive negative First Amendment justifications counsel

17. Id.
18. Id. at 1686.
19. State and federal statutes, including employment and intellectual property laws,
are also part of this landscape.
20. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686.
21. Id. at 1696–97.
22. Epstein, supra note 14, at 791.
23. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1697.
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skepticism of state power.24 There is no question that civil liability can
and often does regulate the act of speaking. The question is whether
this form of regulation can generally be equated with state suppression
of public discourse.
Consider the great mass of potential tort claims. One of the things
that distinguishes tort from contract claims is that tort law consists of
extrinsically imposed obligations or directives that specify “public norms
of conduct.”25 The communicative torts—that is, those that regulate
speech as a primary subject rather than one among many means of
violating some general duty—are, as the courts have justifiably held,
particularly dangerous to free speech. As descendants of criminal
speech provisions, their provenance alone provides some reason for
special scrutiny. Actions that permit the state, through judges and juries,
to evaluate and ultimately define the boundaries of public civil discourse
raise special First Amendment concerns. Robert Post has described
privacy torts, for example, as “civility rules” that define persons and
communities.26 Some civil liability rules are committed to “the task of
constructing a common community through the process of
authoritatively articulating rules of civility. The common law tort
purports to speak for a community.”27 When they speak to the substance
of public debate, civil liability rules deserve special scrutiny. For similar
reasons, we ought to be wary of civil claims like intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which may facilitate suppression of something as
critical to free speech as political satire.
Absent some First Amendment scrutiny of these claims,
governments would essentially be empowered, through the imposition of
certain tort and statutory duties, to “maintain what they regard as a
suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”28 A public civility
code that rests upon common law or statutory claims is as threatening to
the First Amendment as a campus speech code or a law that proscribes
public utterance of derogatory or offensive words.29
Not all mandatory duties pose this sort of threat, however. For
example, negligence law requires in many contexts that a person warn
others of foreseeable dangers.30 Enforcement of a mandatory duty to
warn “dictates” or compels speech. Under the power-defining approach,
24. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 86 (1982)
(emphasizing deep distrust of government power to regulate expression).
25. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 Geo. L.J. 695,
755 (2003).
26. Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management
56 (1995).
27. Id. at 67.
28. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).
29. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670–71 (1973)
(holding state cannot proscribe speech or conduct that is merely “offensive to good
taste”).
30. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976)
(holding psychotherapist has duty to warn third parties threatened by patients).
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the defendant who fails to comply with a duty to warn would presumably
be entitled to some First Amendment “defense.”31 But imposition of a
duty to speak under these circumstances does not seriously threaten First
Amendment values. The duty to disclose or to warn not only aims to
make us all safer, but creates a more informed citizenry with regard to
certain hazards. This particular duty, although mandatory and relating
directly to the content of speech, does not seek to evaluate or define civil
discourse, or “speak for” a community. Nor does it implicate core First
Amendment concerns regarding compelled belief or state ventriloquism.
As the example shows, the character of the duty matters. The duties
we ought to be most concerned with are those that evaluate and define
the substance of public discourse and debate. We ought to be especially
wary of these civil claims owing to the primary state interests they serve,
namely protecting public audiences from uncivil speech and shielding
persons from various dignitary harms associated with public disclosure.
These purposes directly conflict with the individualism at the core of the
contemporary First Amendment.
It is not simply that some liability rules specify, in very general terms,
“the content of duties that private actors owe to each other,”32 or that
they create rules of social conduct that may impact speech, which poses a
“particularly dangerous” First Amendment threat. It is, rather, what
some tort and statutory standards do—or are capable of doing—to
individuals that marks them as serious threats to free speech. Certain
duties press and impinge upon speakers and speech in a manner and to
a degree that others do not. Some communicative or expressive duties
aim principally to regulate what can be said to another. Others specify
how information can properly (“civilly”) be obtained and shared with
the public. These duties are not merely duty-defining; they are persondefining and expressive community-defining in a much broader sense. This
is what renders defamation, false light, and privacy torts far more serious
threats to free speech than the duty not to interfere with possession of
one’s chattels, marital relations, or prospective economic advantages. In
the latter actions, moreover, speech often occurs in more private settings
and is regulated not for its own sake, but as one means of accomplishing
some other forbidden end. It is thus difficult to characterize these forms
of liability as “cases where the government is using the civil liability system
in ways that are especially dangerous.”33
To be clear, I am not suggesting that speech concerns are absent in
any of these contexts. But just as the authors would have contract law
play the principal role in assessing “coercion,”34 courts could apply tort
31. The defense would undoubtedly fail. Indeed, Solove and Richards might argue
for a categorical rule to that effect. That adjustment may be warranted; but creating
categorical rules cannot resolve questions regarding the accuracy or viability of the powerdefining approach.
32. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686.
33. Id. at 1697 (emphasis added).
34. See id. at 1701 (suggesting that coercion “would be an issue for contract law, not
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and statutory liability in light of free speech concerns without holding
the First Amendment fully “applicable” any time a mandatory duty is
imposed.35 Where the common law or statutory duty is not itself
constitutionally tainted, perhaps it would be best to allow states to
experiment with, develop, or repeal doctrines that implicate speech
concerns.36
The power-defining framework improves upon the autonomy
approach by asking what is unique, and uniquely threatening, about
certain forms of civil liability. We ought to conceive of “duty-defining
power” as regulatory power that not only undermines or eliminates
speaker autonomy, but authorizes an evaluative process by which the
state dictates the substance of public discourse. So characterized, dutydefining power is a form of censorship or suppression that merits serious
First Amendment scrutiny.
B. Property Lines
When, as suggested above, we measure the substance of a duty
against First Amendment values and concerns, the property lines drawn
by the duty-defining approach seem somewhat incongruous. The tort
duty not to trespass onto the land of another is defined by the state, is
mandatory, and may indeed affect speech. Although they prohibit
speakers from converting the private property of another into a speech
forum, thus affecting the location of expression, property rules do not
generally purport to evaluate or dictate the substance of public
discourse. If they are to be congruent, the First Amendment’s property
lines ought to mark off places in which the state arguably has some duty
to facilitate expression. It is in such places that property exclusions pose
the greatest threat to free speech.
Solove and Richards reject the Hudgens rule, which holds that the
First Amendment is not technically applicable on private properties.
They contend that the First Amendment is also substantively applicable
whenever a civil no trespassing duty is enforced.37 This means that a
trespassing backyard or living room protester possesses a First
Amendment interest in expressing herself in that location. The authors
are clearly uncomfortable with this result, which conflicts with significant
residential privacy interests and the basic First Amendment principle
that speakers do not have a right to convey messages “whenever and
however and wherever they please.”38 They retreat to the position that a
categorical rule, namely that the homeowner’s interests always outweigh
the First Amendment”).
35. See, e.g., Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 159 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa. 1960) (“Words in
themselves, no matter how threatening, do not constitute an assault.”).
36. See Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of
Constitutionalizing State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173, 179 (arguing that
constitutionalization of assault and other torts would be unwise).
37. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1698–99.
38. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (emphasis added).
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the trespasser’s, may be appropriate.39 Notably, by contrast, their
approach would permit those in gated communities, condominium
associations, and other private associations to enact and enforce
substantial speech restrictions by covenant or agreement.40 Putting aside
which of these limitations is actually the greater threat to free speech,41
the boundaries here seem anomalous; the trespasser in a private
community would enjoy some level of First Amendment protection,
while the residents of the community may enjoy none at all.
Property is indeed critical to free speech. The where of speech can
be just as important as what may be said or how information may be
disseminated. But in terms of First Amendment values, not all places are
of equal significance. The greatest threats to free speech in terms of
property rules are the public forum and time, place, and manner
doctrines, which have resulted in increasingly diminished opportunities
for expression and exchange even in traditional public forums.42 The
First Amendment is undoubtedly both technically and substantively
applicable to regulations of public expression in these places; the
problem lies in the balance that has been struck between state and
speaker interests.
Solove and Richards correctly reject the traditional state action
frame, which obscures more than it elucidates, with regard to private
properties. The more appropriate question, as Mark Tushnet has
recently observed, is whether the government has a substantive duty to
provide or protect the right in question.43 With respect to properties
that are generally open to the public, tend to be heavily subsidized by
the state, and facilitate access to large public audiences, one could
plausibly argue that government has a duty to facilitate and protect
expressive rights.
Exclusion from quasi-public venues like large
shopping centers, which have replaced the town squares and public
streets speakers have largely abandoned or been displaced from, poses
the greatest threat to the First Amendment. Increasingly, it is only in
such places that significant public audiences can be found.44 With
regard to these properties, trespass enforcement may well be “dutydefining,” in the sense that it suppresses public discourse on a
substantial portion of our expressive topography. By contrast, backyards
and living rooms are not significant speech venues; restricting access to
39. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1698–99.
40. See id. at 1700–01 (discussing restrictive residential covenants).
41. See Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties
in Public Places 159–61 (2008) (discussing free speech implications of “gated
communities” and other forms of privatization).
42. See id. at 53–59 (criticizing “judicial bureaucratization” of public places).
43. Mark Tushnet, State Action in 2020, in The Constitution in 2020, at 69, 70 (Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009) (“[T]he state-action doctrine is not really about
what the state does, but what it has a duty to do.”).
44. See N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757,
779 (N.J. 1994) (recognizing, under state constitution, that “if the people have left for the
shopping centers, our constitutional right includes the right to go there too, to follow
them, and to talk to them”).
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such places has little to do with public debate. The state has no duty to
extend speech protections over backyard fences or through front doors.
Property-based duties not to trespass on, interfere with, or convert
private property certainly “shape social conduct in ways defined by the
state.”45 But as with the duty to warn, this is not sufficient to render the
First Amendment fully applicable. The substance of these duties, which
protect against interference with possession or use of real property and
chattels, seems rather far removed from concerns regarding state
censorship or suppression of speech. That is not to say that no First
Amendment concerns arise where property rules exclude speakers from
preferred venues. But again, there are ways to address such concerns
short of imposing First Amendment standards on all private properties.46
CONCLUSION
Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability will enhance critical thinking
about the boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil domain. The
power-defining approach is an impressive attempt to blend principles of
state power and speaker autonomy into a coherent and workable
formula. Solove and Richards successfully untangle the confidentiality
knot. Their approach resolves difficult borderline cases in which
different standards sometimes collide. It is determinate without, as the
authors show through various examples, being rigidly categorical.
Moreover, by focusing on power, Solove and Richards remind us that
some liability rules can be as dangerous to free speech as ordinary laws
and regulations. I have raised questions about the extent to which we
ought to constitutionalize speech-related civil actions. But disagreement
with regard to where the boundaries of the First Amendment’s civil
domain ought to be drawn is perhaps inevitable with a project of this
scope. Solove and Richards may not have drawn perfect boundaries.
But the lines they have drawn, and more importantly the reasons for
them, are more coherent and determinate than those that currently
exist.
Preferred Citation: Timothy Zick, “Duty-Defining Power” and the First
Amendment’s Civil Domain, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 116 (2009),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/116_Zick.pdf.

45. Solove & Richards, supra note 1, at 1686.
46. Courts might, for example, tighten the requirements for a prima facie case where
speech concerns are present. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303–04 (Cal.
2003) (requiring recipient of noncommercial spam email to prove actual damage to
computer to state trespass to chattels claim).

